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The Evolution of the Law of Evidence: Plus ça
change . . .?
Robert J. Currie*
Originally prepared as a CLE backgrounder for criminal lawyers, this article
provides a brief and occasionally critical account of developments in the law of
evidence over the last three or so decades. Particular attention is paid to the Supreme Court of Canada’s introduction and development of the “principled approach.” It is argued that this framework has been most successful where it has
coalesced into a more traditional-looking “rules-based” stance, albeit one based in
principle, and less so where looser tests of principle have been given freer rein.

À l’origine, cet article a été écrit dans le cadre d’un programme de formation
continue destiné aux avocats spécialisés en droit criminel. Il fournit un compte
rendu bref, et parfois critique, des développements entourant le droit de la preuve
au cours des trois dernières décennies. Dans cet article, l’auteur apporte une attention particulière à l’introduction et à l’élaboration de l’approche raisonnée par
la Cour suprême. L’auteur présente l’argument que ce cadre conceptuel fonctionne
mieux lorsqu’il est combiné à un point de vue plus traditionnel fondé sur des
règles, mais tout de même fondé sur un principe, et moins bien lorsque des tests de
principes moins rigides ont libre cours.

1. INTRODUCTION
A long time ago in England, or so the story goes, trials were held by courts to
determine the guilt or innocence of people accused of crimes. Rules of evidence, in
particular rules of exclusion, developed over the course of hundreds or thousands of
cases. They were time- and trial-tested by judges and lawyers, and generally they
worked. However, in a given case a judge might see a serious inequity result if the
prevailing rule was applied strictly, but because of stare decisis the judge could not
reject the rule. Accordingly, exceptions to the rules developed. But then the exceptions began to cause problems, and so qualifications to the exceptions had to be
employed. And so on, until the rules had become ossified, overly formalistic, and
unwieldy.
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Canadian courts inherited this body of rules, and its attendant problems, from
the English common law. Parliament made half-hearted attempts at evidence law
reform that did little to help, and there was only modest appetite for codifying the
law of evidence as had been done by American federal courts. By 1982 Justice
Dickson (as he then was) was moved to describe the law of evidence as “[a] large
number of cumbersome rules, with exclusions, and exceptions to the exclusions,
and exceptions to the exceptions.”1 Then, two remarkable things happened. First, in
1982 Parliament enacted the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and re-invigorated a
bunch of long-neglected ideas like fair trials, protection against self-incrimination
and restraining the investigative powers of the state. Second, starting in 1990 (or
possibly before), the Supreme Court of Canada developed what is now called the
“principled approach” to the law of evidence, replacing dusty, unworkable rules
with a reusable template of “principled flexibility.” And all was well again.
Or so the story goes.
Writing in 1937, American evidence heavyweights Edmund Morgan and John
Maguire described the hearsay rule and its exceptions in the following passage,
which in many ways could have been generally applied to the law of evidence:
“. . .an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by
cubists, futurists and surrealists.”2 Modern evidence law reform in Canada, as carried out by the Supreme Court of Canada, has been primarily geared towards combating the “crazy quilt” approach. In its place the Court has ushered in “a dynamic
model based upon the application of the competing goals of the law of evidence,
competing societal interests, and competing Charter rights and values.”3 The modest goal of this article is to explore briefly the development of this dynamic model,
as a means of evaluating the current state of Canadian evidence law. While it is
both arbitrary and artificial to try to disentangle the various threads that make up
this picture, various interweaving features will be dealt with individually for the
sake of comprehensibility.
As this article surveys the advent and legacy of the principled approach, the
impact of the Charter, and the development of trends and interests that have
wrought further changes on the law of evidence, the question to keep in mind is,
simply, are we better off? Are “principles” truly better than “rules”? Or are we
living proof of the old adage, plus ça change, plus que la même chose: the more
things change, the more they remain the same?

2. FUNDAMENTAL THEMES AND PROPOSITIONS
At the risk of sounding simplistic, it may help to start from basic propositions.
Judges and criminal trial lawyers, both Crown and defence, have very difficult
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R. v. Graat, 1982 CarswellOnt 101, 1982 CarswellOnt 745, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 819, 31
C.R. (3d) 289, 2 C.C.C. (3d) 365 at 835 (S.C.R.).
E.M. Morgan & J.A. Maguire, “Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence” (1937)
50 Harv. L.R. 909 at 921.
J. Sopinka, S.N. Lederman & A.W. Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed
supplement (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2004), §1.108. And see the latest edition of
this work: A.W. Bryant, S.N. Lederman & M.K. Fuerst, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant,
The Law of Evidence in Canada, 3rd ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2009), c. 1.
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tasks. The difficulty stems from the fact that their work involves two of the most
closely held social and legal values we have: the administering of the criminal
sanction and the liberty of the individual. Since the guilty must be punished, the
State must have a workable fact-finding structure available at trial. Since liberty is
endangered by the criminal law, it is important that the decision-making process
which the trial embodies be executed in as scrupulous and fair a manner as reasonably possible. Even so, there has always been the recognition that the world does not
begin and end in the courtroom, and that criminal litigation operates as part of a
larger legal system, which has a number of interests to protect and objectives to
achieve. Accordingly, fact-finding has to be balanced with these interests in some
way. One of the terrible beauties of modern evidence law reform is that the Supreme Court and senior appellate courts have, for the most part, felt compelled to
deal explicitly and openly with this tension, in a manner that both drives and is
driven by the principled approach and Charter values.
This matrix of factors manifests itself, I suggest, in three fundamental themes.
First, the law of evidence remains dedicated, as it always has been, to the pursuit of
truth. As Professor Paciocco has written, “[t]he function of the law of evidence is
to facilitate [substantive law] by regulating the proof of facts so that those substantive laws can be applied to true facts.”4 The suggestion is that the law is not legitimate unless it is rendered on the basis of facts that are true,5 and thus as Justice
Cory wrote in R. v. Nikolovski, “the ultimate aim of any trial, criminal or civil, must
be to seek and ascertain the truth.”6 This is not to say that we are under any illusions that the litigation process is likely to produce absolute or scientific proof, but
rather that we must approximate the truth as best we can.7 Nonetheless, criminal
litigation is forensic in nature, because in the end we must try to figure out “what
happened.”8
Second, achieving truth and figuring out what happened requires sustained and
explicit attention to the process by which evidence is held to be receivable by the
trier of law and thus placed before the trier of fact. This has meant the knitting
together of two tools that at first blush seem opposed: exclusion and inclusion. The
traditional name for the rules of evidence is the “canons of exclusion,” and there is
no doubt that in its origin the law of evidence was exclusionary in nature.9 The law
of evidence has always been primarily geared towards making sure the “good” evidence is put before the trier of fact, while the “bad” evidence is kept out of the
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D.M. Paciocco, “Evidence About Guilt: Balancing the Rights of the Individual and
Society in Matters of Truth and Proof” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 433 at 436.
R. v. T. (W.P.), 1993 CarswellOnt 1056, 83 C.C.C. (3d) 5 (C.A.) at 16 [C.C.C.], per
Doherty J.A.
1996 CarswellOnt 4425, 1996 CarswellOnt 4426, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197, 111 C.C.C.
(3d) 403, 3 C.R. (5th) 362 at para. 13.
Though for an alternative view see K.D. Kilback & M.D. Tochor, “Searching for Truth
but Missing the Point” (2002) 40 Alta. L. Rev. 333.
E. Swift, “A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay” (1987) 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1340 at
1347-54.
See J.B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1898) at 264.
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courtroom and excluded from the decision-making process. The relative “goodness” or “badness” of evidence is largely a function of its reliability or “trustworthiness.” As Richard Peck explains, “[r]educed to its nub, this concept required that,
absent some inherent or intrinsic reliability, proffered evidence that could not be
tested through cross-examination would be excluded.”10 The exclusion of unreliable evidence, then, leads to better fact-finding.
On the other hand, at some point exclusion must give way to inclusion. In the
last several decades the Supreme Court of Canada has embraced the idea that “basic principles of the law of evidence embody an inclusionary policy,”11 on the basis
that the trier of fact should have access to relevant and probative evidence “in order
to foster the search for the truth.”12 This was put most bluntly and effectively by
Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Corbett: “Rules which put blinders on the trier of fact
should be avoided except as a last resort. It is preferable to trust the good sense of
the jury and to give the jury all relevant information, so long as it is accompanied
by clear instruction in law from the trial judge regarding the extent of its probative
value.”13 In R. v. Jarvis 14the Supreme Court suggested that the availability of relevant evidence to the trier of fact was a “fundamental principle of justice” under
section 7 of the Charter, evidencing the constitutional character that must be accorded to what was previously a matter of judicial policy.
The third major theme is the necessary balancing of society’s interest in accurate fact-finding with other interests. The search for truth must ultimately be a
“qualified” one,15 in that allowing every relevant and probative fact to be admitted
might costs more than it is worth to the other values it would compromise. This
theme is most prominently exercised through the application of the Charter to exclude evidence, but is also reflected in limitations put on the admissibility of evidence by the importance accorded to confidentiality for certain kinds of relationships (primarily by the law of privilege), to the interests of victims, communities,
and other “third parties” to criminal cases, and to such emerging meta-interests as
privacy. It is also a matter of utility, in that judges are empowered to exclude evidence that, while relevant, is of limited practical use to the trial process and will
serve only to waste time and resources:the classic example of which is the rule
against rebuttal in collateral matters.16
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15
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R. Peck, “The Adversarial System: A Qualified Search for the Truth” (2001) 80 Can.
Bar Rev. 456 at 468.
R. v. Corbett, 1988 CarswellBC 756, 1988 CarswellBC 252, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, 41
C.C.C. (3d) 385, 64 C.R. (3d) 1 at para. 50 (per Dickson C.J.) and para. 111 (per La
Forest J.) (QL).
R. v. Levogiannis, 1993 CarswellOnt 131, 1993 CarswellOnt 996, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475,
25 C.R. (4th) 325, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 327 at 334 [C.R.], per L’Heureux-Dubé J.
Corbett, supra note 11 at para. 35.
2002 SCC 73, 2002 CarswellAlta 1440, 2002 CarswellAlta 1441, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757,
6 C.R. (6th) 23, 169 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at para. 68.
Peck, supra note 10: the author describes this as “a democratic decision to qualify the
search for the truth” (at 467).
See the statement of Baron Rolfe in Attorney General v. Hitchcock (1847), 1 Exch. 91
at 44-45 (Eng. Exch.): “If we lived for a thousand years instead of about sixty or sev-
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These three themes, then, have been the drivers of modern evidence law reform in Canada. They are embodied in what the Supreme Court of Canada has
repeatedly described as the fundamental principle of evidence law: all relevant and
probative evidence should be admitted, unless it should be excluded pursuant to a
clear ground of policy or law.17 This axiom is reflected in various aspects of how
evidence law has evolved, but most notably the “principled approach,” to which I
will now turn.

3. THE PRINCIPLED APPROACH
The adoption of the “principled approach” has been the core of the evolution
of evidence law over the last several decades, and the other developments discussed
below are intertwined with, or at least affected by, this doctrine. In a 2003 lecture,
Justice David Doherty described it as:
. . .a process whereby admissibility is determined by identifying the underlying rationale or policies that favour admission of the evidence and those
that favour exclusion. Once these policies are identified, the principled approach requires that they be weighed and balanced against each other. That
calculus is done in the context of the specific facts of each case. As Chief
Justice McLachlin said. . .;. “The principled approach comes down to this.
Will the evidence help more than it will hurt?”18

To this should be added that since the goal is for trial judges to make discretionary decisions on the basis of principles, considerable curial deference is intended to be exercised by appellate courts to admissibility rulings, though they
must employ the correct principles and thus these decisions remain reviewable as
questions of law.
The principled approach is often viewed as having begun with the new hearsay framework adopted by the Supreme Court in the early 1990s, specifically in the
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18

enty, and every case were of sufficient importance, it might be possible, and perhaps
proper, to throw a light on matters in which every possible question might be suggested, for the purpose of seeing by such means whether the whole was unfounded, or
what portion of it was not, and to raise every possible inquiry as to the truth of the
statements made. But I do not see how that could be; in fact, mankind finds it to be
impossible. Therefore some line must be drawn.”
See, e.g. R. v. Morris, 1983 CarswellBC 695, 1983 CarswellBC 730, [1983] 2 S.C.R.
190, 7 C.C.C. (3d) 97, 36 C.R. (3d) 1.
Justice D.H. Doherty, “The Admissibility of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings:
A Principled Approach in a Post-Charter World” in Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 2003: The Law of Evidence (Toronto: Irwin, 2004) 1, at 2.
For more exposition, see D. Paciocco & L. Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 5th ed.
(Toronto: Irwin, 2008), c. 2; H. Stewart, “Justice Frank Iacobucci and the Revolution in the Common Law of Evidence” (2007) 57 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 479; P.
Sankoff, “The Search for a Better Understanding of Discretionary Power in Evidence Law” (2007) 32 Queen’s L.J. 487; C. Hill et al., Canadian Criminal Evidence, 4th ed., looseleaf (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2006) c. 3; P. Healy,
“Developments in the Law of Evidence: The 1993-94 Term — Admissibility,
Discretion and the Truth of the Matter” (1995) 6 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 379.
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cases of R. v. Khan,19 R. v. Smith20 and R. v. B. (K.G.).21 Yet in criminal cases, at
least,22 arguably the seeds were sown in the early 1980s by Justice Dickson (as he
then was) in the cases of R. v. Graat23 and R. v. Vetrovec.24 In each of these cases
(dealing with the lay opinion rule and jury warnings regarding the credibility of
“unsavoury” witnesses, respectively) Justice Dickson cut through what he viewed
as an unnecessary and unwieldy body of law and distilled conditions for admissibility down to the basic underlying rationales that lay behind the old rules, to be applied flexibly and sensibly to the evidence before the court. The eminent good
sense of this approach became apparent, and by 1994 Justice Marc Rosenberg
(writing pre-judicially) was moved to comment “[p]rinciple rather than precedent
has helped the Court devise rules which it hopes are fairer, more likely to lead to
accurate fact-finding and more responsive to the needs of the present society.”25 It
is now beyond doubt that the principled approach to admissibility is grundnorm of
evidence law, as can be seen in the Court’s approach to hearsay,26 bad character

19
20
21
22

23
24
25
26

1990 CarswellOnt 108, 1990 CarswellOnt 1001, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, 79 C.R. (3d) 1,
59 C.C.C. (3d) 92.
1992 CarswellOnt 997, 1992 CarswellOnt 103, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915, 15 C.R. (4th) 133,
75 C.C.C. (3d) 257.
1993 CarswellOnt 76, 1993 CarswellOnt 975, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740, 19 C.R. (4th) 1, 79
C.C.C. (3d) 257.
Also worth considering are the Court’s modification to the hearsay exception for business records in Ares v. Venner, 1970 CarswellAlta 80, 1970 CarswellAlta 142, [1970]
S.C.R. 608, and the adoption of the Wigmore “case-by-case” approach to privilege for
confidential information in Slavutych v. Baker (1975), 1975 CarswellAlta 39, 1975
CarswellAlta 145F, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 254, the latter of which Chief Justice McLachlin
described in pre-judicial writing as a “principle approach” (B. McLachlin, “Confidential Communications and the Law of Privilege” (1977) 11 U.B.C.L.R. 266 at 268-69).
Supra note 1.
1982 CarswellBC 663, 1982 CarswellBC 682, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811, 27 C.R. (3d) 304,
(sub nom. R. v. Gaja) 67 C.C.C. (2d) 1. And see Sankoff, supra note 18 at fn. 3.
M. Rosenberg, “Developments in the Law of Evidence: The 1992-93 Term: Applying
the Rules” (1994) 5 S.C.L.R. (2d) 421.
R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, 2006 CarswellOnt 7825, 2006 CarswellOnt 7826,
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, 42 C.R. (6th) 1, 215 C.C.C. (3d) 161; R. v. Couture, 2007 SCC
28, 2007 CarswellBC 1365, 2007 CarswellBC 1366, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 517, 47 C.R. (6th)
1, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 289; R. v. Devine, 2008 SCC 36, 2008 CarswellAlta 784, 2008
CarswellAlta 785, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 283, 57 C.R. (6th) 1, 232 C.C.C. (3d) 1; R. v.
Blackman, 2008 SCC 37, 2008 CarswellOnt 3722, 2008 CarswellOnt 3723, [2008] 2
S.C.R. 298, 57 C.R. (6th) 12, 232 C.C.C. (3d) 233.
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evidence,27 expert opinion,28 the common law confessions rule,29 and various other
areas.
The principled approach is operationalized by a balancing exercise, specifically the balancing of the probative value of an item of evidence (its value to factfinding) versus the prejudicial effect it could have on the trial (in the form of unfairness, distortion of fact-finding or unnecessary time consumption). Chief Justice
McLachlin recently summed up this balancing process:
First, the evidence must be useful in the sense of tending to prove a fact
relevant to the issues in the case. Second, the evidence must be reasonably
reliable; unreliable evidence may hinder the search for truth more than help
it. Third, even useful and reasonably reliable evidence may be excluded in
the discretion of the trial judge if its probative value is overshadowed by its
potential for prejudice.30

Rather than simply rely on this as a generally applicable principle, however,
the Supreme Court has worked it into specific admissibility regimes for different
kinds of evidence. R. v. Handy provides one of the most explicit examples of this,
in which Justice Binnie for the Court broke the probative value versus prejudicial
effect weighing into distinct phases for the admissibility of similar fact evidence.
Working in the traditional rationale behind the similar fact rule, he provided various criteria upon which the probative value of this kind of evidence must be assessed, most notably the degree to which the evidence demonstrates a “specific
propensity” on the part of the perpetrator. He then constructed a means for assessing prejudicial effect, instructing the courts to consider the “moral prejudice” and
“reasoning prejudice” that similar fact evidence can generate. In light of this trend,
it has become common to note that the “rules” of evidence are fast-becoming specific applications of the general balancing of probative value versus prejudicial
effect.
The adoption of the principled approach has undoubtedly improved the law of
evidence, in full line with the rationalist tradition that always underpinned it. However, it has been, to use a hackneyed phrase, an uncertain revolution. A problem
with proceeding on principle is that the resulting admissibility exercise lacks certainty and specificity, and in some cases will force perhaps excessive reliance on a

27
28

29
30

R. v. Handy, 2002 SCC 56, 2002 CarswellOnt 1968, 2002 CarswellOnt 1969, [2002] 2
S.C.R. 908, 1 C.R. (6th) 203, 164 C.C.C. (3d) 481.
R. v. Mohan, 1994 CarswellOnt 1155, 1994 CarswellOnt 66, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 29
C.R. (4th) 243, 89 C.C.C. (3d) 402; R. v. Trochym, 2007 SCC 6, 2007 CarswellOnt
400, 2007 CarswellOnt 401, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 239, 43 C.R. (6th) 217, 216 C.C.C. (3d)
225.
R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, 2000 CarswellNS 257, 2000 CarswellNS 258, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 3, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 36 C.R. (5th) 129.
Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue, 2001 SCC 33, 2001 CarswellNat 873,
2001 CarswellNat 874, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at para. 29. And see the following
dictum of La Forest J. in Corbett, supra note 11: “All information that is relevant
to the issues before the court should be admissible in evidence unless the risk or
effect of prejudice exceeds its probative value” (at 714).
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trial judge’s “read” of a particular case.31 This can, in turn, produce results that
have to be corrected upon review. None of this is, of course, unexpected, and is part
of the price we pay for a more rational process. However, the appellate review
context is greatly complicated by being based upon a balancing exercise which appears to anticipate that different admissibility decisions can be made about the
same kinds of evidence, which might have “more” probative value in one case than
in another. This will often be unsatisfactory; context can only take us so far. Moreover, as Judge Healy pointed out (in pre-judicial writing), it can have unpredictable
effects on the overall administration of justice:
A less developed but no less significant aspect of the principled approach is
the proposition that the application of legislative rules can be trumped in
specific instances by reference to the basic axiom of probative value and
prejudice. Reliance on this proposition can have either inclusionary or exclusionary effects. The ramifications of this proposition are radical. If rules
of general application can be trumped or suspended so as to do justice in the
instant case, there must be an underlying assumption that the quality of justice in the instant case must be ranked as a superior value to the consistent
administration of justice in the general run of cases.32

What is intriguing is that, as the common law on the principled approach has
developed, the courts have often been forced into imposing order upon discretionary exercises of “principle,” in a manner that looks suspiciously like a rule-based
regime.33 An examination of the caselaw on Vetrovec warnings is instructive. Justice Dickson’s principled and common-sense notion was that the trial judge should
give a warning when the credibility (or lack thereof) of a given witness called for it.
Some types of witness might be more likely to require a warning, but there was to
be no hard and fast rule and no “categories,” simply an exercise of discretion by the
trial judge. The content of the warning, too, was to be driven by the circumstances
of the case and the witness. However, in 2000, in the case of R. v. Brooks,34 a
majority of the Supreme Court essentially ruled that this was still the case, except
when it came to “jailhouse informants,” who were deemed dangerous enough to
always override any exercise of discretion the trial judge might make. Nine years
later, in R. v. Khela,35 the Court laid out what looked suspiciously like a list of
“rules” regarding what the warning should convey, to the point that the majority
reasons earned a warning against “mechanical” application from Deschamps J. in
her concurring reasons.
Handy, too, is worth a closer look. The pre-2002 caselaw on similar fact evi-

31
32
33
34
35

D. Stratas, “The Law of Evidence and the Charter,” in LSUC Special Lectures, supra
note 18, 277 at 332.
Healy, supra note 18, at 386.
Indeed, Healy, among others, predicted this at an earlier stage of the development of
the principled approach; see Healy, supra note 18 at 386.
2000 SCC 11, 2000 CarswellOnt 292, 2000 CarswellOnt 293, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 237, 141
C.C.C. (3d) 321, 30 C.R. (5th) 201.
2009 SCC 4, 2009 CarswellBC 69, 2009 CarswellBC 70, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, 62 C.R.
(6th) 197, 238 C.C.C. (3d) 489.
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dence was confusing at best,36 with the Court badly divided on how to utilize two
seemingly irreconcilable principles: that particularly relevant and probative evidence of similar conduct should be admitted to prove conduct, and that reasoning
from past conduct to present conduct was too prejudicial to allow admission of the
past conduct. Justice Binnie responded with a masterful judgment that rationalized
the admissibility of similar facts as a function of “specific propensity,” and encased
admissibility into a detailed inquiry of probative value, prejudicial effect and a balancing of the two. That inquiry is extremely detailed, to the point where it resembles a grocery list of admissibility considerations, to be applied “contextually,” and
in the trial judge’s discretion, of course.
By contrast, the hearsay jurisprudence, the crown jewel of the principled approach, has a troubled history. The legal and intellectual problems that are at play
when considering hearsay evidence are profound, and the introduction of the “necessity and reliability” principles as the basis for its admissibility was an admirable
effort to strip the classic “ossified” list of rules down to its core. However, the
assessment of reliability, in particular, has continued to bedevil the courts. Practically speaking, grounding the admissibility of hearsay in “reliability” led to a trend
of senior appellate courts logically dispensing with the traditional hearsay exceptions in favour of individualized assessment in every case, a development the Supreme Court was compelled to arrest, twice.37 In affirming the traditional hearsay
exceptions as the first stop on the admissibility track, the Court heeded the advice
of L’Heureux-Dubé J. (in dissent in R. v. Starr38) when she lamented that hundreds
of years of valuable judicial insight were in danger of being tossed aside for a
“principled” exercise that would inevitably produce more voir dires and less
certainty.
Doctrinally speaking, in the currently leading decision of Khelawon the Court
has tried to explain previous decisions as simply fact-specific examples, or very
loosely-cast categories, of the general reliability assessment. Arguably this demonstrates one of the pitfalls of the principled approach: if there are no fairly solid
rules, every case becomes a law reform exercise, with the attendant headaches for
the senior courts. Here again, the area of hearsay which has perhaps been most
effective has been the so-called “K.G.B. exception,” which has something fairly
close to “rules” attached to it, though even this has not been without problems.39
This admittedly limited survey seems to highlight one of the outcomes of the
principled approach: the closer it comes to putting in place a rules-based regime, it
is more successful, but markedly less so in areas where the tendency has been to
stick to principles. Perhaps we should look again to the salutary effect of higher
courts imposing order upon admissibility by way of actual rules — principled rules,
to be sure, but rules nonetheless. Perhaps that is what is happening, and we should

36
37
38

39

See R.J. Delisle, “Annotation: R. v. Handy,” (2002) 1 C.R. (6th) 209.
In R. v. Mapara, 2005 SCC 23, 2005 CarswellBC 963, 2005 CarswellBC 964, [2005] 1
S.C.R. 358, 195 C.C.C. (3d) 225, 28 C.R. (6th) 1, and in Khelawon, supra note 26.
2000 SCC 40, 2000 CarswellMan 449, 2000 CarswellMan 450, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144,
36 C.R. (5th) 1, 147 C.C.C. (3d) 449. Though this is not to say that the rest of the Court
was not alive to these concerns; see the reasons of Iacobucci J. at paras. 202–207.
See Devine, supra note 26.
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simply acknowledge it more explicitly. As the principled approach to evidence continues to evolve, we will increasingly be able to discern that, sometimes the Emperor has no clothes; or as Watt J. (as he then was) more diplomatically expressed
it, that “there is no single organizing or justificatory principle that underlies every
rule” and “no general requirement of reliability applicable to each item of evidence
tendered for admission.”40 And as Judge Healy reminds us:
The law of evidence became complex over two hundred years precisely because the underlying principles of probative value and prejudice were given
more particular meaning in relation to recurring problems. There is great
value in this complexity if it lends coherence and consistency to decisionmaking in the courts. There is ever-diminishing value in principles of probative value and prejudice that are stripped of complexity and nuance to the
point that there is little prescriptive guidance for trial courts and counsel and
little basis for prediction that similar problems will be resolved with similar
outcomes.41

4. THE CHARTER
Strictly speaking, the Charter’s biggest impact has been upon criminal procedure, as opposed to criminal evidence. However, there is no doubt that Charter
values are to be found throughout the modern law of evidence and that they have
contributed mightily to the evolution of the law. Outside of the exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) (discussed below), perhaps the most powerful impact has
stemmed from the constitutional rights to procedural fairness and a fair trial embodied in sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter. In particular, various common law
rules of evidence have become “constitutionalized” by way of their intersection
with Charter standards, such as “the right of an accused to cross-examine prosecution witnesses without significant and unwarranted constraint,” which the Supreme
Court called “an essential component of the right to make a full answer and defence.”42 Also, the voluntariness component of the common law confessions rule
has, since R. v. Singh,43 become fully integrated with the test for whether there has
been a violation of the pre-trial right to silence in the context of a police
interrogation.
Some of the most interesting recent scholarship on this issue has been done by
Professor Paciocco,44 who argues that while it has operated “[i]n subterranean fashion, the Charter has changed the very culture of proof and process by not only
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colouring our general conceptions of what is fair, but by changing relevant legal
technique.”45 Specifically, he attributes to the Charter two new techniques for constructing evidence law. The first is the “exclusionary discretion,” which emerged
from a line of cases extending from Corbett to R. v. Potvin46 to R. v. Harrer47 and
which gives trial judges the ability to exclude otherwise admissible Crown evidence on a probative value versus prejudicial effect basis with the liberty interests
of the accused (particularly trial fairness) front and centre in the analysis. The second is the “inclusionary discretion,” which beginning with R. v. Seaboyer48 linked
the principled approach with the need to apply the admissibility principles less rigidly regarding defence evidence. This has resulted in the Court injecting discretion
into rules in such a way that the rules themselves could survive Charter challenges,49 and also shaping the rules in such a way as to encourage the admission of
defence evidence, again with the accused’s liberty (and also privacy) as the shaping
instrument.50 However, with discretion, comes uncertainty, and the Charter culture
of “vaguely-phrased, fact-sensitive tests” has also earned it criticism on that
basis.51
The elephant in the room for some time was the exclusion of evidence under
section 24(2) of the Charter. Until recently the Supreme Court’s judgment in R. v.
Stillman52 was the leading and controversial centerpiece. The Court’s rule of automatic exclusion of conscripted and conscripted derivative evidence was under attack basically from the moment of its issue,53 not least because of the complex
superstructure and analytical difficulties it inspired. A sea change came in 2009
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with the Court’s decisions in R. v. Grant54 and R. v. Harrison,55 which saw the
Court radically revise its approach to 24(2). Most relevant here is the abandonment
of Stillman’s automatic exclusion of any evidence that might have an impact on the
fairness of the accused’s trial, in favour of a ramped-up return to the actual text of
section 24(2) and emphasis on the need to “preserve public confidence in the rule
of law and its processes.”56 In this new matrix it is the seriousness of the state’s
violation of Charter rights that creates the most weight towards exclusion, and it
seems clear that evidence which is otherwise reliable and was not gathered in particularly heinous circumstances will be admitted. It is early days to try to analyze
the overall impact on the development of the law of evidence,57 and it remains to
be seen whether Grant can (or even should) be rationalized along with the exclusionary/inclusionary discretion identified above.
Grant, incidentally, demonstrates another interesting and recent feature of the
Charter’s impact on the evolution of the law of evidence, which is that it has seen
senior appeal courts in open revolt on “constitutionalized” points of evidence; and
Grant brings to two the number of occasions on which the Supreme Court of Canada has backed down.58

5. OTHER POLICY INFLUENCES
(a) Wrongful Convictions
In the wake of a string of high-profile wrongful convictions, some of which
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were the subject of judicial inquiries,59 it has become clear that both the content
and the application of the rules of evidence have played a role in the conviction of
the innocent. To some extent this is an offshoot of the Charter-mandated fair trial
rights to which the Court has given effect, but since the late 1990s the Court has
consistently invoked the “spectre of wrongful conviction” as a stand-alone factor
affecting its treatment of evidence law.60 This is particularly apparent in the
Court’s hearsay jurisprudence, where it has repeatedly emphasized that the importance of the reliability requirement in the principled exception is based on the need
to maintain trial fairness and avoid wrongful conviction.61
While the goal of preventing wrongful convictions is generally consonant with
the principled approach, this factor has sometimes had a distorting effect on otherwise “principled approaches.” For example, it was recognition of the prominent
role played by jailhouse informants in wrongful conviction cases that led to the
result in Brooks, referred to above, where an essentially mandatory Vetrovec warning was imposed upon an otherwise discretionary decision-making process by the
trial judge.

(b) Stereotypes, Social Context, Privacy, and Third-Party Interests
Another evolutionary track that can be observed in Canadian evidence jurisprudence is an increasing awareness that the rules of evidence essentially construct
facts, and often do so in a way that does not reflect the experiences of those whose
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situations are out of the ordinary.62 The application of “common sense,” long the
pride of the common law courtroom, is slowly giving way to the need for more
awareness of individualized circumstance and social factors that fly below the radar
of many judges, lawyers, and jurors. The Supreme Court of Canada has engaged,
along with Parliament, in an effort to “cleanse”63 the law of evidence of stereotypes
and assumptions that hinder accurate fact-finding. This began with measures to accommodate sexual assault victims, particularly children,64 and victims of spousal
abuse, but lately has extended to giving more attention to racial65 and cultural issues that are often at play in fact-finding.66 Also, it is clear that privacy (both as a
constitutional norm under section 8 of the Charter and as a more general societal
precept) is having an impact, particularly as regards victims.67 As Justice Doherty
has remarked, there is support for the view that “evidence that has some plus value
to the search for the truth will be excluded to vindicate privacy and equality concerns of complainants.”68

6. CONCLUSION
The advent of the principled approach has obviously profoundly changed the
law of evidence. That the change has overall been for the better seems to be the
dominant opinion; distinguished commentators often make remarks like “[t]he Supreme Court is doing nothing more than being true to the objectives that underlie
the law of evidence.”69 On the other hand, it has its limitations and its critics. In a
recent personal conversation, one respected Canadian authority on evidence law
referred to the principled approach as “build your own pizza night,” suggesting that
such an approach is fine for those with the will and wherewithal to do it but lamenting that for busy lawyers who would like to have some predictability in their trial
preparation, surely a set menu with actual rules is more desirable. As I commented
earlier, one of the problems with contextually driven rules of admissibility is that
they can be used too flexibly; an item of evidence of shaky probative value at best
might be admitted in one case and excluded in another, on some vague basis of
“context.” One could not fairly say that the law of evidence is, or is in any danger
of becoming, “ossified” any longer; but as suggested above, perhaps there is such a
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thing as too much dynamism and principled flexibility.
A disturbing trend that has lately been noted is that the major and muchlauded features of evidence law’s evolution have had a pincers effect on the ability
to actually administer criminal justice. In their Report of the Review of Large and
Complex Criminal Case Procedures, Justice LeSage and Professor (now Justice)
Code explicitly attributed the delay in long and complex cases both to Charter motions and to the proliferation of evidentiary voir dires wrought by the principled
approach.70 Their proposals for addressing the various problems, however, were
procedural and made no mention of evidence law reform as a possible solution.
Whatever the reasons for this, what is clear is that the law of evidence has evolved
itself into the maelstrom of overall criminal justice reform. We may have exchanged one “crazy quilt” for another. The story is far from over, and it is difficult
to know what to wish for; but it is possible the solution lies in something a little
less protean, and a little more static.
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